Abstract-We address the problem of securing the route discovery in mobile ad hoc networks, proposing a light-weight yet robust routing protocol, the Distance-Vector Secure Routing Protocol (DV-SRP). DV-SRP discovers on-demand multiple routes, which are established across the network, without providing explicitly the network connectivity. DV-SRP combines the advantages of the type of route discovery first introduced by AODV, with security and thus resilience to adversaries that disrupt the route discovery. Compared to previous proposals in the literature to secure the AODV-like route discovery, DV-SRP is either more robust, or more efficient, or more general.
INTRODUCTION
Independently of security considerations, a multitude of routing protocols has been proposed, with a number of those heading towards standardization through the MANET WG [2] . Different protocols are shown to be appropriate for different network settings, and, clearly, there may not be a single protocol that outperforms all alternative ones in all settings.
Our focus in this paper is the reactive route discovery that resembles the Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) protocol [1] , whose operation can be advantageous: nodes maintain information only for destinations they actively communicate with, and the network overhead per route request and reply packet does not increase with the number of nodes along a discovered route. From a different point of view, another advantage is the improved concealment of topological knowledge, as the control and data packets do not carry the links of the discovered or utilized routes.
What we are after here is to ensure the correctness of the route discovery. Two proposals in the literature secure the AODV-like route discovery. The Secure AODV (S-AODV) [5] is a secure version of AODV, proposing a combination of public key cryptography and hash chains. The Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks (ARAN) [4] is a secure protocol that resembles somewhat AODV, but it does not seek to provide AODV's features.
In this paper, we propose the Distance-Vector Secure Routing Protocol (DV-SRP), which is either more robust, or more efficient, or more general than previous proposals to secure this type of route discovery. DV-SRP prevents adversaries from manipulating the length (hop count) of the discovered routes, uses primarily symmetric key and thus low cost cryptographic primitives, and discovers multiple routes. Next, we discuss the network and adversary models. Then we present the operation of DV-SRP, followed by an analysis and discussion.
II. NETWORK AND ADVERSARY MODEL
A network node is a process with a unique identity V, a public/private key pair E V , D V , a module implementing the networking protocols, such as DV-SRP, and a module providing communication across a wireless network interface, e.g., based on the widely adopted IEEE 802.11 [7] . We are concerned with pair-wise communication across multiple wireless links between a source S and a destination T. We denote S and T as the end nodes, and nodes that assist the S, T communication as intermediate nodes. We assume that each end-node knows the identity and the public key of its peer endnode, and all nodes know the identities and the public keys of their neighbors. These, as well as the establishment of symmetric shared keys by the end nodes or two neighbors, can be achieved by protocols such as the Neighbor Lookup Protocol (NLP) or mechanisms that are part of the Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) [13] , [8] , [3] .
We consider two models of active adversaries, independent adversaries and arbitrary adversaries [13] . Independent adversaries can modify, forge, or replay routing or data packets, but ignore received traffic that does not comply with the operation of the networking protocols, and thus do not generate any message due to the receipt of such traffic. Any message that does not follow the expected, protocol-specific format or fails one of the protocol checks is deemed as noncompliant. We emphasize that traffic is non-compliant if and only if the receiving node can detect that a message does not comply with the protocol; otherwise, messages that appear to be compliant, but actually are not, are processed as compliant. If non-compliant traffic is attributed to misbehavior, independence implies that adversaries do not process and relay traffic that appears to originate from or have been previously relayed by an adversary. In other words, independent adversaries do not attempt to assist other adversaries mounting an attack, either by ignoring the attack and further relaying traffic or by not responding to received non-compliant traffic.
This model of failures allows for a range of malicious behaviors and it is more general than crash, omission failures, and timing failures [10] , [11] . Even though the malicious behavior of independent adversaries is constrained, the model does not prevent adversaries from simultaneously launching their attacks, which may have a compound effect. As it will become clear, the model of independent adversaries serves as a necessary condition to achieve stronger protocol properties than those achieved without the model's constraint on the adversarial behavior.
In general, adversarial nodes are allowed to deviate from the protocol execution in an arbitrary manner [12] . Arbitrary adversaries can be more sophisticated and powerful than independent adversaries, having, for example, knowledge of the identities of other adversaries in the network, devoting resources (e.g., route discovery) to establish direct and possibly private communication with other adversaries, and exchanging traffic and information about their local execution of the protocol.
III. DISTANCE VECTOR SECURE ROUTING PROTOCOL
The source node (S) generates a route query or route request packet (RREQ). The route request fields include S, T, a query identifier Q that was not previously used, and an authenticator
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A to authenticate S as the origin of the RREQ at each intermediate node. Moreover, the maximum node count field, MNC, is set to a protocol-selectable positive integer value, and the maximum hop count field is set to MHC=h
is calculated as a function of the route query fields and a key K. 2 Finally, the node count field is set to NC=1, and the hop count field to HC=h(x 0 ). S transmits the route request, i.e., broadcasts it, and initializes an empty ForwardList for each RREQ it generates, and retains NC and HC. S adds to the ForwardList each neighbor V it overhears relaying RREQ with NC=NC+1, and HC=h(HC). If either of the previous two equalities does not hold, S ignores the RREQ. Each node receiving a RREQ determines if its own identity matches the sought destination. 1 h is a one-way function and x 0 is a random number. 2 The function f and the key depend on the cryptographic primitives. Similarly to SRP [3] , K can be a symmetric key shared by S and T. A , MHC) and compares it to A′ . If there is not a match, S rejects the reply. Otherwise, it accepts the reply. 3 The PreviouslySeen( ) routine can be implemented in different ways, trading off robustness for lower routing overhead, defining different query propagation mechanisms. For DV-SRP, only a single copy of each query identified by the S, T, Q triplet is relayed, as long all protocol-specific checks succeed, by each intermediate node. We denote this as the QueryPropagation 1 mechanism. When invoked at the destination, PreviouslySeen( ) returns true if the RREQ is received from a different neighbor. 4 The node that previously relayed the RREQ that is now processed. 5 The node that relayed the RREP that is now processed. 
IV. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
DV-SRP ensures that in the presence of arbitrary adversaries no loop includes correct intermediate nodes, and that the route reply is generated by the destination within a (t 1 , t 2 ) interval, where t 1 is the time at which S generated the route query and t 2 the point in time at which S received the route reply. This implies that a route along which the RREQ and RREP propagated existed in the network. If not, S would have never received RREP. However, two or more arbitrary adversaries M 1 and M 2 can 'tunnel' RREQ, RREP packets to each other across multiple hops. Moreover, with M 1 , M 2 ,…, M k , k≥2, arbitrary adversaries forming a path, any of the M 2 ,…, M k-1 , (in general, k>2) may deviate from the protocol, and relay protocol packets while not performing the required checks. As a result, in the first case, the number of hops between M 1 and M 2 , and, in the latter case, k-2 hops between M 1 and M k can be 'hidden' or 'inflated' by the adversaries.
In the presence of independent adversaries, DV-SRP provides stronger properties. The number of hops of the discovered route is correct at the source node: an adversary M cannot decrease or avoid increasing the route length, and it cannot increase the hop length.
A decrease or no-increase of the length is prevented, because one of M's predecessors will discard the corresponding RREP. The increase of the route length is prevented because M has to relay RREQ with the correct HC and NC fields. Finally, consider the following case: an adversary M fully complies with the RREQ propagation rules, and later receives a RREP from W to V, with V, in turn, bound to relay RREP to its predecessor U. Then, if M is a neighbor to both W and U, it might relay the RREP before V. This would result in a structurally intact route, which, nevertheless, includes an adversary. To prevent such an attack, nodes relaying a RREP can encrypt the route ID using neighbor-to-neighbor symmetric keys [8] . In general, to counter adversaries complying with the secure route discovery to place themselves on a route, protocols such as the Secure Message Transmission (SMT) and the or the Secure Single Path (SSP) protocols are necessary [6] .
Compared to S-AODV, DV-SRP prevents an independent adversary M from increasing the hop count, and also prevents such an adversary from 'rushing' an overheard legitimate RREP, that is, relay it to some node U before U's successor V. Compared to ARAN, which discovers only one route based on the first-received route reply, DV-SRP is more general, as it provides the correct length of the route in the presence of independent adversaries, and it discovers multiple routes. Compared to both protocols, DV-SRP is more efficient, as it makes limited use of public key cryptography, but rather relies primarily on symmetric key primitives that incur roughly three to four orders of magnitude lower processing overhead. We note that DV-SRP, as well as S-AODV and ARAN, require authentication of the end nodes at all intermediate nodes handling RREQ and RREP packets, unlike SRP [3] . Moreover, we note that neither DV-SRP nor S-AODV or ARAN can ensure that routes are link-or node-disjoint, a useful feature for multipath data forwarding [9] .
